This is a lively and spirited discussion—perhaps more appropriately called one side of a debate—by Feyerabend against traditional views in the philosophy of science associated with such persons as Carnap, Hempel, and Popper. The central issue is whether or not there exists a neutral method for the construction of scientific systems and whether, more specifically, there is within that method some uniform, rational evaluation measure for arbitrating between competing theoretical models. Traditional positions, whether they be of a verificationist, conformationist, or (...) falsificationist sort, presuppose that there is some rational method for analyzing and evaluating scientific theories. Feyerabend maintains most emphatically that there is not. He rejects the distinctions between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, between experience and theory, and between observation terms and theoretical terms. In the clash between traditional philosophies of science and the more historical and sociological approaches associated with the names of Kuhn and Hanson, the author sides with the latter. He goes even farther, however, and maintains what he calls an "anarchistic theory of knowledge" in which "anything goes." Within his approach it is not canons of rationality and logic which have dominated or ought to dominate scientific discussions. Rather, a proponent of a new theory utilizes persuasion and cunning rather than appealing to or using objective conditions for guiding choices between competing theories. New paradigms within science do not triumph because they are more rational; they depend on utterly new criteria of rationality. (shrink)

A study of phenomena familiar to us but largely overlooked in our everyday lives and in philosophy—the phenomena of sound. The author, in what is almost a meditative form of writing, wishes to disengage the reader from the predominant, visualist tradition in philosophy and western thought generally and to reintroduce listening and sound as autonomous realms of experience. What he develops is a phenomenology of sound which utilizes themes from the works of both Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl himself did not (...) completely escape the dominance of the visualist tradition in western thought. For him perceptual experience was primarily visual. However, according to Ihde, the emphasis on a description of experience in the phenomenological reduction provides categorical schema for understanding sound and a basis for surveying the auditory terrain and the "voices" of the world as independent phenomena. Husserl’s analysis of perceptual experience distinguishes between focus, fringe, horizon, and that which is absent or empty in experience, and Ihde applies this set of distinctions to a descriptive analysis of the auditory dimension. Roughly the first half of his book is given over to such a Husserlian description of the presence of sound. (shrink)

The dominant feature of eighteenth-century aesthetic is the inquiry and discussion concerning the theory of “taste.” There is material or bibliographical evidence of this in the rapid sequence of treatises, essays, inquiries, observations, and controversies on this subject, extending from the close of the seventeenth to the last years of the eighteenth century, and bearing the names, in France, of Dacier, Bellegarde, Bouhours, Rollin, Seran de la Tour, Trublet, Formey, Bitaubé, Marmontel, and, still more eminent, of Montesquieu, Voltaire, d’Alembert; in (...) England, of Addison, Hume, Gerard, Home, Burke, Priestley, Blair, Beattie, Percival, Reid, Alison; in Italy, of Muratori, Calepio, Pagano, Corniani; in Germany, of Thomasius, J. U. König, Bodmer, A. von Schlegel, Wegelin, Heyne, Herz, Eberhard, J. C. König, and, by German influence in Hungary, Szardahely; and, greatest of all, Immanuel Kant, whoseCritique of Judgmentconsists in the main of a critique of the aesthetic judgment of taste. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hypermediated Art CriticismPamela G. Taylor (bio) and B. Stephen Carpenter II (bio)Technological media catapults our perception into what Marshall McLuhan called "new transforming vision and awareness."1 As our lives become more and more immersed in such technologies as television, film, and interactive computers, we find ourselves inundated with a heightened sense of mindfulness—an aesthetic experience made possible through such computer technological characteristics as hyperlinks, hypermedia, and hyperreality. In these (...) terms, the prefix "hyper" represents various linking devices inherent to computer technology that allure and transport us between, above, below, and toward vast areas of information, places, and peoples. Hypermediacy, according to Bob Cotton and Richard Oliver, is "an entirely new kind of media experience born from the marriage of TV and computer technologies. Its raw ingredients can be brought together in any combination. It is a medium that offers random access; it has no physical beginning, middle, or end."2 In other words, there is no set or static structure inherent in technological media. It is not so much an "anything goes" apparatus as it is an "anything is possible" system. The seemingly vast possibilities inherent to technological media offer us many and alternate views of the world.Just as technological media encourage multiple means of viewing the world, no single approach to art criticism can be considered dominant, as several methods, methodologies, and approaches exist for responding to [End Page 1] works of art. We conceive of art criticism as a complex means of making meanings about works of art and communicating those meanings to other people. Following the lead of art educator Terry Barrett,3 art criticism hinges on the four activities of describing, interpreting, judging, and theorizing about art. Barrett suggests that, although all four overlap, interpretation is the most important and most likely the most complex aspect of art criticism. Although interwoven with description, analysis, and judgment, interpretation of the meanings of individual works of art is of foremost concern in contemporary art criticism. Similarly, we situate hypermediated art criticism as a synthesis of our descriptions, interpretations, judgments, and theories—both verbal and visual—with the various ways in which computer technology facilitates the simultaneous existence, representation, storage, and presentation of these and other forms of meaning making about works of art.Hypermediated art criticism is built upon our own technological abilities to both create and follow divergent paths, ideas, and beliefs according to our choices. Hypermediated art criticism is inclusive of the ways that our choices change daily depending upon our situation, role, and purpose, or simply as a result of what we witness or experience in a moment. In the hypermediated criticism process, our ways of seeing and knowing change from a linear to multilinear perspective, from single to multilayered, and from static to mutable perception. Indeed, the disparate ways of seeing and knowing made possible through technological media and hypermedia provide us with an expansive and personally reflective approach to art criticism.Personal Reflection and Art CriticismMichael Joyce, known for his poetic approach to computer hypertext theory and fictional writing, says, "We are who we are. Layered and overlaid, we make a world within our bodies."4 Possibly now more than ever that world within our bodies can be represented, re-presented, and re-invented right before our eyes through technological media. Digital ethnographer Ricki Goldman-Segall refers to this technological world as a learning constellation in which "we are each composed of many selves, all of which interact with each other as we learn.... With the use of new computer technologies, we extend not only our technological abilities, but also our various personae—the societies of our minds—in the form of new objects for others to think with."5 In the classroom, hypermediated art criticism generated through computer technology functions just this way—as new objects that we, and our students, use to help us extend the ways in which we think about works of art.Contrary to the antihumanist approach so often associated with computer technology theory,6 our discussion of hypermediated art criticism—the symbiotic relationship of art criticism and technology—begins with the [End Page 2] basic assumption that a primary purpose of... (shrink)

In this fascinating new collection of essays, contemporary historians examine the ways earlier historians have framed, written, and "made" the Jewish past. Probing the ideology and methodology of their professional predecessors, American and Israeli historians offer new perspectives on some of the central figures of twentieth-century Jewish historiography, including Gershom Scholem, S. D. Goitein, Yitzhak Baer, Elias Bickermann, and Cecil Roth, as well as the Israeli "New Historians." Although the lives and work of these scholars differ in many ways, Jewish (...) historians have recurrently confronted the challenges posed by assimilation, antisemitism, and various forms of nationalism. Through their critical examinations of the construction of the Jewish past, the contributors to this volume develop important insights into current attitudes toward the dominant canons and ideals of historical scholarship and the future of historiography. They shine new light on the formation of a historical worldview and the "making" of history. (shrink)

PURPOSE:To report the localization of a gene causing drusen and macular degeneration in a previously undescribed North American family. METHODS:Genetic mapping studies were performed using linkage analysis in a single family with drusen and atrophic macular degeneration. RESULTS:The clinical manifestations in this family ranged from fine macular drusen in asymptomatic middle-aged individuals to atrophic macular lesions in two children and two elderly patients. We mapped the gene to chromosome 6q14 between markers D6S2258 and D6S1644. CONCLUSIONS:In a family with autosomal dominant (...) drusen and atrophic macular degeneration, the gene maps to a 3.2-cM region on chromosome 6q14. This locus appears to be distinct from, but adjacent to, the loci for cone-rod dystrophy 7 (CORD7) and North Carolina macular dystrophy (MCDR1). Future identification of the gene responsible for the disease in this family will provide a better understanding of macular degeneration. (shrink)

Conditionals are central to inference. Before people can draw inferences about a natural language conditional, they must interpret its meaning. We investigated interpretation of uncertain conditionals using a probabilistic truth table task, focussing on (i) conditional event, (ii) material conditional, and (iii) conjunction interpretations. The order of object (shape) and feature (color) in each conditional's antecedent and consequent was varied between participants. The conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and took longer to process than conjunction (mean di (...) erence 500 ms). Material conditional responses were rare. The proportion of conditional event responses increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with 55% of participants showing a qualitative shift of interpretation. Shifts to the conditional event occurred later in the feature-object order than in the object-feature order. We discuss the results in terms of insight and suggest implications for theories of interpretation. (shrink)

More than a decade after Philip P. Wiener and Frederick H. Young edited the first volume of Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Moore and Robin have brought together a collection of essays which serves as a valuable supplement to that earlier publication. It is more than a supplement, however; it can stand on its own as a significant contribution to Peirce scholarship. Continuity with the first volume is achieved through new essays which analyze Peirce's theory of belief, (...) of habit, and of Scotistic realism—themes about which many of the earlier papers revolved. Novelty is achieved through increased emphasis on Peirce's logical and mathematical writings and on the influence of nineteenth century evolutionism upon Peirce's pragmaticism. The exploration of the latter motif in the three contributions of W. Donald Oliver, Rulon Wells, and Thomas A. Goudge is particularly noteworthy. In their Preface, Moore and Robin state that the most significant contribution of this new volume is the revelation of the extent to which Peirce was first a scientist and then a philosopher. This is a misleading characterization of the book. True, Victor F. Lenzen's "Charles S. Peirce As Astronomer" is an engaging piece. On the other hand, the bulk of the articles impress the reader with the originality and modernity of Peirce, the philosopher and Peirce, the logician. The most notable feature of this collection is the number of essays which draw parallels between dominant philosophical and logical themes found in Peirce's writings and major interests of mid-twentieth century philosophers. Impressive examples are: A. R. Turquette's "Peirce's Icons For Deductive Logic," Richard M. Martin's "On Acting On A Belief," Larry Holmes's "Prolegomena To Peirce's Philosophy Of Mind," and Richard J. Bernstein's "Peirce's Theory of Perception." In presenting the articles which constitute this volume the editors give evidence not only of the relevance of Peirce for the contemporary student of philosophy but also of the impetus which Peirce's thought has provided for creative philosophical analysis. An additional bonus for Peirce scholars are two bibliographies prepared by Max H. Fisch. One is a supplement to Arthur W. Burk's 1958 bibliography of works by C. S. Peirce. The other is a draft of a bibliography of works about C. S. Peirce.—B. G. R. (shrink)

Let ω be the set of natural numbers. For functions f, g: ω → ω, we say f is dominated by g if f < g for all but finitely many n ∈ ω. We consider the standard “fair coin” probability measure on the space 2ω of in-finite sequences of 0's and 1's. A Turing oracle B is said to be almost everywhere dominating if, for measure 1 many X ∈ 2ω, each function which is Turing computable from X is (...) dominated by some function which is Turing computable from B. Dobrinen and Simpson have shown that the almost everywhere domination property and some of its variant properties are closely related to the reverse mathematics of measure theory. In this paper we exposit some recent results of Kjos-Hanssen, Kjos-Hanssen/Miller/Solomon, and others concerning LR-reducibility and almost everywhere domination. We also prove the following new result: If B is almost everywhere dominating, then B is superhigh, i. e., 0″ is truth-table computable from B ′, the Turing jump of B. (shrink)

During the three centuries from 800 to 500 B.C., the Greek world evolved from a primitive society- -both culturally and economically- -to one whose artistic products dominated all Mediterranean markets, supported by a wide overseas trade. In the following two centuries came the literary, philosophical, and artistic masterpieces of the classic area. Vital to this advance was the development of the polis, a collective institution in which citizens had rights as well as duties under the rule of law, a system (...) hitherto unknown in human history. In this study, the first systematic exploration of the forces that created the political framework of Greek civilization, Chester Starr shows how the Greeks emerged form a Homeric world of individuals to the polis of 500 B.C. The age-old conflict between the self-serving demands of human beings and the less vocally-expressed needs of the community serves as the backbone of Starr's interdisciplinary analysis of the rise of the polis. (shrink)

Ryle's recent retirement after almost a half-century of study, teaching and writing might well be regarded as the end of an era. A large segment of the philosophical world has come to regard him as the embodiment of the spirit of Oxford. His clear and informal style, his gift for fresh analogies and striking similes, his mastery of the epigram, have set new literary standards for philosophical writing. Largely responsible for inaugurating the B. Phil. and D. Phil. programs after World (...) War II for the benefit of graduate students from abroad, Ryle both as Waynflete professor of metaphysics and editor of Mind has enormously influenced the thinking of Anglo-American philosophers. Apart from his Concept of Mind, Dilemmas and Plato's Progress, his writings have taken the form of reviews, short articles or essays addressed to specific philosophical issues. Though many of these have become minor classics and have graced innumerable anthologies, it is only now that we have virtually the whole of this important segment of his writings available in book form. With the exception of four essays published originally in French, the papers in these two volumes have been published previously in English, mostly in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Analysis or Mind. They range in time from his early days at Oxford to 1968 and cover a wide range of topics, mainly in the areas of philosophical methodology, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mind. Only the fields of moral, political and aesthetic philosophy are comparatively neglected. The first volume contains his critical essays on individual thinkers. They include studies on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as his pieces on such contemporary thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Carnap, Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore and John Anderson, who dominated the Australian scene during the first half of this century. The second volume contains 37 pieces dating back to 1929. It is worth mentioning that despite their brevity, Ryle's introductions to these volumes throw considerable light on his philosophical development. While professional philosophers will be happy to have these collected papers in their present form, we hope they will soon become available in less costly editions for student use.--A. B. W. (shrink)

Few will, I think, doubt that the Trio from the Minuetto movement of Mozart's G Minor Symphony seems simple, direct, and lucid—even guileless. Its melodies are based upon common figures such as triads and conjunct diatonic motion. No hemiola pattern, often encountered in triple meter, disturbs metric regularity. With the exception of a subtle ambiguity..., rhythmic structure is in no way anomalous. There are no irregular or surprising chord progressions; indeed, secondary dominants and chromatic alterations occur very frequently. The instrumentation (...) is quite conventional, and no unusual registers are employed. In this essay, Leonard B. Meyer, Benjamin Franklin Professor of music and humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, further explores and details the significance of theories advanced in his book, Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "Concerning the Sciences, the Arts - AND the Humanities," appeared in our first issue. (shrink)

Inasmuch as a good many of the Australian philosophers one would like to see included are not represented, and some of the contributors are no longer teaching in Australia, the title of this volume is somewhat misleading. It contains an introduction by Alan Donagan and the following original essays: J. Passmore, "Russell and Bradley"; L. Goddard, "The Existence of Universals"; B. Ellis, "An Epistemological Concept of Truth"; P. Herbst, "Fact, Form, and Intentionality"; M. Deutscher, "A Causal Account of Inferring"; D. (...) M. Armstrong, "Colour-Realism and the Argument from Microscopes"; K. Campbell, "Colours"; C. B. Martin, "People"; M. C. Bradley, "Two Arguments Against the Identity Thesis"; D. H. Monro, "Mill's Third Howler"; G. Schlesinger, "The Passage of Time." Though the essays are original and admirable, there does not seem to be anything distinctively Australian, rather than American or British, about their contents. Perhaps the most enlightening fact about them is that neither the Andersonian tradition of Sydney nor the Wittgensteinian tradition of Melbourne which dominated the Australian philosophical scene in the early 1950's is pre-eminent any longer, or even in evidence.--A. B. M. (shrink)

Although Ordinary Language Philosophy is widely believed to have disappeared leaving scarcely a trace in this era of formal semantics, it is very much the formal semantics of ordinary language that dominates the scene. More common ground than one might have supposed proves thus to be available for the unreconstructed ordinary language philosopher, in the present volume, to enter into the thick of current discussion. The prevailing tone of the work is certainly much more formal than anything one recalls from (...) the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, and in its episodic fashion the central topics—e.g., reference, opacity, identity, propositions—are standard enough, though by the end an effort has been made to reinstate synonymy, analyticity, and even verificationism. On the specific side of grammar the nominalization of sentences receives extended attention, and it is in that connection that Bede Rundle queries the postulation of propositions as metaphysical objects for the so-called propositional attitudes. The deepest, most pervasive theme of the book turns out to be that of ontological commitment. In an uncharacteristic, refreshing moment of testiness Rundle confides that serious controversy as to whether there are or are not events "just cannot get going unless our ordinary language is supplanted... by the grandiose but ill-defined jargon of ‘ontology'." The focus of the work tends to be blurred owing to a tacit assimilation of Quine to the formal semanticists of ordinary language. If the Quinean framework of ontological commitment would seem to be almost ubiquitous today, the semantic emphasis on the ontological commitments of ordinary language renders the current fashion almost as alien to Quine as to the later Wittgenstein. Rundle is thus faced with a shifting target. His excellent anti-Fregean, quasi-nominalistic discussion of number brings out some of the difficulty. Sensitive to the difference between the nonreferential and referential uses of number words in ordinary language, Rundle argues that one can only go so far with the former. Accordingly, he will allow that "by ordinary standards there quite clearly are numbers", a thesis that neither Wittgenstein nor Quine—for very different reasons—would accept. At the outset of his book Rundle writes as follows, "We could look more favorably upon the pragmatic approach if there were room for a choice, if the analysis of the meaning of, say, sentences seemingly alluding to certain abstractions, left the question of existence undecided. There are reasons for thinking that this cannot be so, and the arguments to come will, I hope, bear out the general objection in particular cases." The discussion of number fails to connect with Quine who readily concedes ordinary language to the nominalist. It is only when one consults such items as sets, which Quine takes to have scarcely any footing in ordinary language, that his pragmatism comes properly into its own. Are the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory analytic or synthetic? Are they perhaps synthetic a priori? Shall we indeed accept them as true? It can hardly be supposed that pre-Quinean approaches, whether empiricist or rationalist, have proved very fruitful here. And what guidance can linguistic analysis provide? (shrink)

Consecutive waves of paleolithic migrants crossing the Bering land bridge from Siberia to North America between 80,000 and 7,000 b.c. brought with them the shamanic way of harnessing supernatural powers. This way prevailed until the White intrusion 400 years ago, into the living space of the aboriginal peoples of North America. Wherever European political, religious, and economic dominance was established, shamanic institutions became the focus of negative attention. The shamanic practitioner was variously depicted by governmental and ecclesiastic authorities as a (...) charlatan and imposter or a purveyor of evil influence. Some well-known ethnological and medico-psychological experts have until very recently portrayed the shaman as a mentally deranged person whose “primitive” culture permits the acting-out of psychopathology in a prestigious role, a eurocentric and positivistic fallacy rooted in Western misinterpretations of learned behavior manifested during shamanic rituals involving altered states of consciousness. Legal measures to suppress shamanic ceremonials were taken in the United States, especially in the aftermath of the Ghost Dance. This shaman-inspired movement, originating in the Prophet Dance of the Pacific Northwest (Spier 1935), sent waves of hectic sacro-nativistic ceremonial activity through many Amerindian tribes, and finally culminated in the Sioux uprising of 1890 which ended in the tragedy of Wounded Knee (cf. Mooney 1896). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)Carlos SteelJohn M. Dillon. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. x + 252. Cloth, $65.00.When Plato died, in 347 BC, he left behind not only the collection of philosophical dialogues we still read with admiration, but also a remarkable organization, the "Academy," wherein his students continued (...) the discussion he had initiated. Dillon's latest book is an attempt to recreate the intellectual climate in the Academy during the first generations after Plato's death, the "Old Academy," called thus to distinguish it from the "New Academy," which started with Arcesilaus in the mid 270's, who abandoned doctrinal speculations for a sceptical stance. Given the elusive nature of the dialogues, the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has been controversial from the beginning. Therefore, scholars always have been eager to know in which direction Plato's first successors—Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo—took the Academy; thus they hoped to find some justification for their own interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, our information on the doctrines of Plato's first successors is scarce. Browsing through the fragments collected by scholars, one may be tempted to conclude that it is not such a great disaster that most texts of the Old Academy have been lost. For it seems that the Academy after Plato was leaning towards a rather esoteric metaphysical speculation about the first principles, which makes us lament on what has become of the philosophical heritage of Plato, a genius fallen into the hands of epigones. One gets the impression that the original and refreshing philosophical contributions came from outside the Academy, from the Lyceum founded by Aristotle and continued by Theophrastus, and later from Epicurus and Zeno and their new schools, which will dominate the Hellenistic period. This, however, is not the view of Dillon: "It will be the thesis of this book that Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call Platonism" (v). Even early Stoicism is, in Dillon's view, a "development and formalization of contemporary Platonism" (235).In an introductory chapter Dillon discusses the location and juridical structure of the Academy and gives a general survey of the main doctrines of the school. The following three chapters present the lives, work and thought of the first heads of the Academy; a final chapter is devoted to some minor members of the early Academy. The book concludes with a short epilogue on Arcesilaus and the reasons for his turn to scepticism. Dillon is an [End Page 204] excellent writer who knows how to tease out and expound the most abstruse philosophical doctrines in a captivating way, mixing, as he does here, biographical anecdotes and witty comments with a sharp analysis of arguments and a speculative reconstruction of lost doctrines. I doubt, however, whether this book will become such a classic as his celebrated The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977).My first worry is anticipated by Dillon himself: "This is perforce a rather speculative book, and no doubt it will be criticized for that" (vii). Dillon defends himself against this critique: I have tried, he says, "to put the most favourable construction on the evidence available to us," his assumption being that the figures he is dealing with "were not philosophical imbeciles"(vii). My reservations are not about Dillon's attempt to construct a coherent doctrine using all relevant information on an author, but about his method of reconstruction, in particular his speculation and his preference for often questionable later material to fill the gaps in our information. "With a good deal of speculation, our exiguous information on Polemo's philosophical position can be fleshed out somewhat" (176). Thus, in his exposition of Speusippus's doctrine of the first principles, Dillon does not start from Aristotle, considering him too biased, but from chapter 4 of Iamblichus's treatise De communi mathematica scientia. In this Neo-Pythagorean treatise, Speusippus is not even mentioned. Even if there are arguments, as Dillon believes, to attribute the doctrine of Chapter 4 to Speusippus, one should... (shrink)

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a six-sided die, and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upwards when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the (...) sides of each die. In two experiments (N1 = 66, N2 = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional’s antecedent and consequent: participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MetanoiaRichard G. T. Gipps, ClinPsyD, PhD (bio)A “honeysuckle on a broken fence”: Scrutton’s (2024) theologically potent image offers us a dignified vision of how a living faith and the experience of mental illness might intersect. Mental and physical illness, deprivation and bereavement sometimes provide a propitious structure on which faith’s bright strands may grow. Scrutton posits no simply causal relationship between faith and mental illness, and steers us helpfully (...) away from the narcissistic overvaluation of inner experience too often met with in (1) mysterium tremendum (meeting-God-blew-my-mind), and (3) mental openness (divine-light-pours-through-the-cracks), formulations. She helps us to avoid settling, too, for the clever-sounding but ultimately too-easy idea of (2) ‘mental illness’ and ‘religious experience’ as different descriptions under which identical experiences may sometimes be brought. For one thing, and to animadvert now in my own vein: can we really—as William James aspires to, say, when he takes it for granted that the “more personal branch [of] feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to... the divine” can be neatly hived off from the “institutional branch of religion... worship... theology... ceremony... ” and so on—even individuate the relevant experiential phenomena independently of their meaning-conferring contexts? For another, it seems to me that too often in the literature of (1) (2) and (3) do we meet with a fatal confusion that can be expressed in terms of a conflation of two meanings of “ego,” as when a) the dropping of the kinds of boundaries which it makes sense to talk of putting up (i.e., our ego’s defensive, prideful, shame-driven shirking of intimacy) is muddled together with b) the crumbling of such individuating ego boundaries as constitute us. Such a confusion gets readily promulgated by vague and tacitly polysemic talk not only of ‘ego’ but also of ‘non-duality,’ ’transpersonal,’ and ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ ‘levels’ of ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ (e.g., see Kasprow & Scotton 1999). Sometimes driving this, one can’t help suspect, is the narcissistic gain of conflating the dismal dissolution of ego boundaries in illness (Conrad, 1958) with the epiphanic transcendence of a grasping and fearful ego. Spiritual pride and spiritual bypass (i.e. fleeing the relational tasks of adult development into a self-preoccupied ‘spiritualised’ inner journey) (Welwood, 2000) then abound, not only for the sufferer but also for the lowly therapist who now receives their shamanic guide/hierophant upgrade. By contrast with all of this, Scrutton’s (4) honeysuckle on a broken fence model stands out in its theological dignity and psychological sobriety.Even so I found myself, on reading Scrutton’s piece, wondering whether a more romantic conception of a growing faith’s possible relation [End Page 257] to psychological disturbance might yet be available and sometimes even find application. What particularly came to my mind was that notion of metanoia as offered us by the existential tradition in both theology and psychopathology.Mark’s gospel begins with John the Baptist heralding Christ’s arrival and preaching the “baptism of repentance [metanoia; μετανοίας] for the remission of sins” (Mark 1:4). Jesus’s first public words then proclaim the same message: “the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye [μετανοεῖτε], and believe the gospel” (Mark 1:15). ‘Repentance’ is today often understood as a sorrowful acknowledgement of one’s wrongdoings, but it has long been acknowledged that, if that be the meaning we give the term, it is an inapt translation of ‘metanoia’ (Walden, 1896). For what the gospel instead calls for is rather a wholesale turning about, or conversion, from ‘ego-dominance to surrender’ (Barron, 2021), i.e. from (a) defensive and illusory attempts to handle our vulnerability and dependency through self-reliance and self-affirmation to (b) an aliveness to grace (i.e. seeing our lives and their bounties under the aspect of the freely given gift) and a trusting surrender to the dominion of that God of love in which we anyway inexorably ‘live and move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28). The ‘I’ in Paul’s “It is no longer I who... (shrink)

``Civic agriculture'' identifies adiverse and growing body of food and farmingenterprises fitted to the needs of localgrowers, consumers, rural economies, andcommunities. The term lends shape andlegitimacy to development paradigms that existin opposition to the global,corporately-dominated food system. Civicagriculture also widens the scope of ag-relatedconcerns, moving away from a strictlymechanistic focus on production and capitalefficiency, and toward the more holisticreintegration of people in place. To date,researchers and practitioners have attendedclosely to the economic benefits of newmarketing arrangements and institutions (e.g.,value-added co-ops, CSAs, (...) and farmer'smarkets). Local food and farming has a criticalrole to play in the development of analternative commerce. At the same time, this isonly half the promise of civic agriculture.Civic agriculture can (and should) promotecitizenship and environmentalism within bothrural and urban settings not only throughmarket-based models of economic behavior, butthrough common ties to place and physicalengagement with that place. (shrink)

From the height of his ninety years of experience, Robert G. Shulman is not just a veteran of World War II, but a world-class biophysicist with a distinguished research career spanning the California Institute of Technology, Bell Labs, and Yale University. A forerunner in the use of nuclear magnetic resonance, Shulman contributed to the study of biochemical processes, founded the Yale Magnetic Resonance Research Center, and shepherded functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) as a dominant tool of cognitive neuroscience. Together with (...) Gregory McCarthy et al., Shulman authored several of the earliest fMRI studies, including the first to explicitly manipulate cognitive processes (McCarthy, Blamire, Rothman, Gruetter, & Shulman, 1993; Shulman, Blamire, Rothman, & McCarthy, 1993). As such, his ideas concerning conscious research piqued our curiosity. We read Brain Imaging: What It Can (and Cannot) Tell Us About Consciousness with anticipation.Shulman comes full circle with his book on brain imaging: although his career spanned meaningful collaborations with behavioural scientists and interactions with researchers from preclinical and clinical fields, he retreats to the comfort of the biophysical sciences. Two prominent, but related, hesitations give us pause regarding his retreat. First, he claims that a behaviourist approach to brain imaging is reasonable and pragmatic for the science of consciousness. Second, he rebuffs subjective and phenomenal forms of evidence. In... (shrink)

Medical technologies and assistive devices such as ventilators and power wheelchairs are designed to sustain life and/or improve functionality but they can also contribute to stigmatization and social exclusion. In this paper, drawing from a study of ten men with Duchenne muscular dystrophy, we explore the complex social processes that mediate the lives of persons who are dependent on multiple medical and assistive technologies. In doing so we consider the embodied and emplaced nature of disability and how life is lived (...) through bodies coupled with technologies and experienced as 'techno-body-subjects in situ'. Normative implications for theory and research, including bioethics research, are discussed. (shrink)